Britain Must Not Be Drawn Into an Unnecessary War with Iran

4,655 words, 25 minutes read time.

Introduction:
At dawn on a Friday in June 2025, Israeli warplanes struck deep into Iran, bombing dozens of nuclear and military sites. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hailed the operation as necessary for Israel’s very survival, after claiming Iran had breached its nuclear obligations. Within hours, Iran retaliated with volleys of ballistic missiles and armed drones aimed at Israeli targets, some reaching their mark. The Middle East now teeters on the edge of a full-scale war. To many, this showdown might seem like the tragic culmination of an inevitable clash over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. But in truth, nothing about this crisis was inevitable. For over two decades, opportunities to defuse the Iran nuclear issue peacefully have been repeatedly squandered. This current escalation is the bitter fruit of those missed chances. And as hawks call for Western military support, Britain must remember the lessons of history. Rushing into yet another Middle Eastern war – one that could have been averted through patient diplomacy – would be a grave mistake. The UK should refuse to be drawn into this escalation and instead champion a return to negotiations before it is too late.

Early Warnings and Failed Diplomacy (2002–2010)

The Iran nuclear crisis first erupted in 2002, when revelations about secret nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak exposed Tehran’s clandestine pursuit of sensitive technology. Iran, a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), insisted its nuclear program was purely for energy and research. But evidence of undeclared facilities and weapons-relevant work ignited global fears that Iran aimed to attain a nuclear weapons capability. Western governments scrambled for a response. In 2003, Britain, France, and Germany (the “EU-3”) opened talks with Iran’s reformist president, Mohammad Khatami, hoping diplomacy could curb the nascent crisis. Tehran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment as a goodwill gesture, hinting that a peaceful solution might be within reach.

Yet this early opening was fumbled. The delicate 2003 enrichment freeze unraveled within two years. Hardliners gained the upper hand on both sides. In Tehran, the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 brought a defiant turn – Iran resumed enrichment and curtailed cooperation with inspectors, asserting its “right” to nuclear technology. Meanwhile, distrust in Western capitals (exacerbated by the specter of Iran’s deception) meant tentative proposals for compromise never fully blossomed. By 2006, diplomacy had collapsed into dueling pressure campaigns. The UN Security Council began imposing sanctions on Iran for failing to halt enrichment. Over the next few years, multiple UN resolutions and ever-tightening US and EU sanctions sought to coerce Iran into compliance. These measures strangled Iran’s economy – costing Tehran over $100 billion in lost oil revenue by 2014 and isolating its financial sector. The strategy was to force Iran back to the table from a position of weakness.

At the same time, a shadow war simmered. Unacknowledged covert operations – widely attributed to the US or Israel – struck Iran’s nuclear program in the late 2000s. The Stuxnet cyberattack, discovered in 2010, sabotaged Iranian centrifuges with devastating effect. Between 2010 and 2012, several Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated in broad daylight on Tehran’s streets. Mysterious explosions rocked Iranian facilities. These clandestine strikes delayed Iran’s progress and demonstrated that the world would not sit idle. But they were no substitute for a lasting diplomatic solution – and they carried the constant risk of deadly Iranian retaliation. By the early 2010s, Iran had installed thousands of centrifuges and amassed a stockpile of low-enriched uranium, steadily shrinking the theoretical time needed to “break out” and produce bomb-grade material. The region found itself in a high-wire stalemate: Iran’s program advancing under sanctions and sabotage, diplomacy largely on hold, and war constantly looming in the background. It was a perilous cycle desperately in need of an off-ramp.

The 2015 Nuclear Deal – A Missed Opportunity Fulfilled, Then Lost

At last, in 2013 a diplomatic opening emerged. The sanctions-fueled economic crisis helped elect Hassan Rouhani, a pragmatist who promised to end Iran’s isolation. Iran and the major powers (including the UK and US) returned to serious negotiations. Years of on-and-off talks bore fruit in July 2015 with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – a landmark deal between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the UK, the US, plus Germany). This agreement was a genuine diplomatic breakthrough. Iran agreed to sweeping restraints that pushed its nuclear program back far from weapons reach. Under the JCPOA, Tehran gave up 97% of its enriched uranium stockpile, capped enrichment at a low 3.67% purity, and dismantled or repurposed thousands of centrifuges. A planned plutonium reactor was gutted and redesigned so it couldn’t produce bomb-grade fuel. Critically, Iran accepted intrusive inspections across its nuclear facilities – far beyond normal NPT safeguards – to verify its compliance. In return, Iran got what it desperately needed: sanctions relief. It regained access to oil markets and billions of dollars of frozen assets as global trade with Iran slowly resumed.

For a time, the JCPOA worked exactly as intended. International inspectors confirmed that Iran dramatically rolled back its nuclear activities and adhered to the deal’s strict limits. Former adversaries engaged in commerce and dialogue instead of threats. The risk of an Iranian nuclear sprint was pushed off for a decade or more. “Breakout time” – the time Iran would need to produce bomb-grade fuel if it tried – expanded from just a few months to over a year. By any measure, this was a victory for peaceful conflict resolution. Britain, as one of the JCPOA signatories, played an important role in achieving this rare success in non-proliferation diplomacy.

And yet, almost as soon as the ink was dry, opponents of the deal worked to undermine it. Israel’s government vilified the JCPOA as a “historic mistake,” arguing it left Iran with nuclear know-how and merely delayed the inevitable showdown. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states – though not parties to the deal – also voiced deep skepticism, worrying that a rehabilitated Iran would only grow more aggressive. Within Iran, hardliners chafed at the temporary constraints on what they saw as national sovereignty. Still, as long as the major powers upheld their commitments, the deal held – until the political winds shifted in Washington.

In May 2018, President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the JCPOA. Trump had excoriated the accord as “a terrible deal” and, against the advice of America’s European allies, he reimposed sweeping US sanctions that had been lifted. The White House embarked on a “maximum pressure” campaign aimed at crushing Iran’s economy and forcing Tehran to accept even stricter terms. This fateful decision – a blatant breach of America’s own obligations – dealt a death blow to the JCPOA’s hopes. Iran had fully complied with the deal; it was the U.S. that broke its word. In Tehran, the moderate voices who had championed compromise were badly undermined. For a year, Iran stayed within the deal’s limits, urging the remaining European powers (Britain, France, and Germany) to somehow offset the US sanctions and preserve the agreement. But European companies, fearing US penalties, mostly pulled out of Iran; the promised economic benefits of the JCPOA evaporated. By May 2019, Iran’s patience ran out. Feeling betrayed and cornered, Tehran began deliberately breaching the nuclear limits – step by step, under careful IAEA monitoring – to pressure the other parties for relief.

Thus began a dangerous new phase. With the deal collapsing, Iran’s nuclear program accelerated once again. Each month brought new Iranian violations: exceeding the cap on uranium stockpile size, enriching uranium to higher levels, installing advanced centrifuges beyond the allowed numbers. The JCPOA’s once-stringent constraints were eroded in tit-for-tat fashion. By early 2020, the confrontation had expanded beyond the nuclear realm. In January 2020, a US drone strike in Baghdad assassinated General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Quds Force – one of Iran’s most powerful figures. Iran retaliated with ballistic missile salvos on US bases in Iraq, dangerously close to full war. Later that year, Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was gunned down near Tehran in an operation widely attributed to Israel. Tehran was enraged: these blows were seen not only as attacks on Iran’s security, but as personal humiliations of its leadership. Hardliners in Iran seized the moment – the Iranian parliament even passed a law mandating an immediate expansion of uranium enrichment and curtailment of inspector access, explicitly citing the need to respond to Western “terrorism” and pressure.

By 2021, the JCPOA was hanging by a thread, if not completely defunct. Iran had ramped its enrichment up to 20% and even 60% purity – levels far beyond the 3.67% limit and edging close to weapons-grade. It also began deploying newer, faster centrifuges and resumed enrichment at underground facilities once prohibited. Equally worrying, Iran in early 2021 suspended the deal’s extra inspections and monitoring measures, unplugging cameras and limiting inspector access. The International Atomic Energy Agency warned that it could no longer verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s activities. In short, the world was now flying half-blind: Iran’s program was advancing largely unchecked, and the risk of a miscalculation or secret breakout was growing.

Stalled Talks and Rising Tensions (2019–2023)

Even as confrontation deepened, diplomatic lifelines still flickered. The advent of the Biden administration in the United States in early 2021 offered a chance to revive the deal. Indirect negotiations in Vienna began, with Britain, the EU and other mediators shuttling between American and Iranian delegations at luxurious hotels. By March 2022, these talks had produced a detailed roadmap for both the U.S. and Iran to return to full compliance with the JCPOA. Hopes rose that the nuclear crisis could be pulled back from the brink. However, a few last disputes proved intractable. Tehran insisted on closure of a sensitive IAEA investigation into past nuclear work and demanded the U.S. remove its terrorist designation on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. Washington, for its part, was reluctant to make such politically costly concessions. Negotiators warned that failure to close the small remaining gap would be a colossal missed opportunity – but that is exactly what happened. By mid-2022, momentum stalled and the talks drifted into limbo. Neither side wanted to declare them dead, yet neither was ready to break the impasse. A final deal slipped out of reach just when it seemed imminent – a textbook case of diplomatic defeat snatched from the jaws of victory.

Meanwhile, Iran’s nuclear program didn’t pause for politics. Throughout 2022 and 2023, Tehran kept installing more centrifuges and enriching more uranium. Western officials watched with mounting alarm as Iran’s “breakout time” – the interval needed to produce bomb-grade material – dwindled to near zero. By late 2022, many analysts believed Iran had accumulated enough enriched uranium for multiple nuclear weapons if it chose to further purify the material. In early 2023, IAEA inspectors made a jarring discovery: they found traces of uranium at 83.7% purity in Iran’s underground Fordow site – just a short step below the 90% needed for a bomb. Iran claimed this was an accidental byproduct of 60% enrichment, not an intentional effort to reach weapons-grade, and the IAEA accepted that explanation. But the incident rattled nerves worldwide, suggesting Iran was testing the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. By the end of 2024, reports indicated Iran could potentially build four nuclear warheads worth of fissile material if it decided to enrich its stockpile to weapons-grade levels. In effect, Iran had become a “threshold nuclear state” – not a nuclear weapons power yet, but so close that the distinction was largely theoretical.

Throughout this period, Tehran’s regional and domestic politics hardened. In mid-2021, the election of ultraconservative President Ebrahim Raisi signaled that Iran’s leadership was digging in, not looking for rapprochement. Raisi aligned tightly with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s deeply skeptical view of the West. Iranian officials insisted that Washington – as the party that broke the JCPOA – must lift sanctions first as a show of good faith, before Iran would reverse any of its nuclear steps. Trust was at rock-bottom on all sides. Still, there were a few glimmers of hope. In mid-2023, Omani mediators quietly facilitated talks that yielded a U.S.–Iran prisoner exchange and reportedly a tentative understanding: Iran would avoid enriching beyond 60% or stockpiling more 60% material, and the U.S. would permit some frozen Iranian funds to be released for humanitarian needs. This informal “less-for-less” deal was never officially acknowledged, but it suggested both Tehran and Washington were trying to contain the crisis, not explode it. Even Iran’s Supreme Leader hinted around this time that he wasn’t opposed to new negotiations – though after Trump’s betrayal, he emphasized Iran would never negotiate “from a position of weakness” again. In effect, Iran was open to diplomacy, but only on the condition that it not repeat what hardliners saw as the mistake of the JCPOA: making major concessions for scant reward.

Unfortunately, events soon overtook these cautious feelers. In October 2023, war erupted between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. That conflict sent shockwaves through the region and derailed any focus on the nuclear talks. Iran, a backer of Hamas (as well as of Hezbollah in Lebanon), loudly condemned Israel’s military response in Gaza. Low-level clashes flared between pro-Iran militias and US forces in Syria and Iraq amid the Gaza war. Though separate from the nuclear issue, this violence further poisoned the atmosphere. In early October 2024, Iran allegedly fired missiles toward Israel, supposedly in retaliation for Israeli actions against Iranian allies. None caused major damage, but the provocation was enough to raise fears of a direct Iran-Israel shooting war. The United States – determined to avoid a broader Middle East conflagration – pointedly warned Israel not to attack Iran in response, urging that opening a new front would be disastrously destabilizing. By late 2024, it was clear that the diplomatic track was on life support. The JCPOA’s core restrictions were expiring or being overtaken by facts on the ground. Iran’s nuclear advances continued under greatly diminished international oversight. The European powers (Britain, France, Germany) tried to keep pressure on Iran by threatening to “snap back” UN sanctions if it went further, but this threat carried little weight once Tehran had already adapted to years of sanctions. In essence, every peaceful offramp had been tried and had failed – or so it seemed to those now advocating more drastic measures.

It is against this backdrop – a diplomatic stalemate and a steadily advancing Iranian nuclear program – that Israel and others began openly weighing military action. Israeli officials had long warned they would “do whatever is necessary” to stop Iran from getting the bomb. As Iran drew closer to nuclear weapons potential, Israeli hawks argued that time had run out for half-measures. The result was the fateful decision we saw this June: Israel taking matters into its own hands.

The Slide to War in 2025

In the early hours of June 12, 2025, Israel launched the largest airstrike campaign against Iran in modern history. Dozens of Israeli jets, likely using routes through regional airspace quietly provided by Gulf states, hammered Iran’s key nuclear installations and military command centers. Explosions rocked sites at Natanz, Fordow, and other facilities long scrutinized by inspectors. Senior Iranian military leaders were caught in the barrages – among the casualties was Major General Hossein Salami, the commander-in-chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Netanyahu announced that this was only the beginning of an extended operation to “remove the threat” of Iran’s nuclear capability once and for all. Notably, Israel’s closest ally, the United States, publicly distanced itself from the attack: Washington claimed it was not involved, an implicit signal that Israel had acted unilaterally. (Whether American officials gave Israel a secret green light is another question – some reports suggest Israel had coordinated with Washington to a degree in advance.)

Tehran’s response was swift and inevitable. Iran declared that Israel had committed an act of war and vowed to make the “Zionist regime” deeply regret its aggression. Within hours, Iran fired salvos of missiles at Israeli cities and military bases, while Iranian drones harassed Israeli airspace. Some strikes got through Israel’s Iron Dome defenses, causing casualties and panic in parts of Tel Aviv. Iran also signaled that U.S. targets could be hit if America joined the fray – a clear warning to keep Washington (and by extension its allies like Britain) on the sidelines. Almost immediately, skirmishes erupted on Israel’s northern border as Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, launched rockets in solidarity (despite having been weakened by its own recent battles). The region braced for a widening war: Israeli jets struck Iranian-linked militia sites in Syria; Iran-backed groups in Iraq fired mortars at U.S. bases. Oil prices spiked on world markets amid fears that Iran might target Gulf shipping or Saudi oil fields in a desperate bid to retaliate.

All the worst-case scenarios that experts had debated for years now loomed very real. It was precisely to avoid this nightmare – a direct Israel-Iran military confrontation with potential to engulf the whole Middle East – that so much diplomatic effort had been expended over the past two decades. And now here we are. Every avenue of peaceful containment or compromise was tried at some point, and every one of them collapsed – some through intransigence, some through bad faith, some through sheer misfortune.

Yet the most dangerous illusion at this juncture would be to think that military action can solve what diplomacy couldn’t. In fact, the resort to force marks a failure of diplomacy that will likely exacerbate, not resolve, the underlying problem.

Military Action Will Only Deepen the Crisis

There is a grim paradox at work: the more pressure and violence are applied to Iran’s nuclear problem, the more intractable that problem may become. Israel’s leaders argue that bombing Iran’s facilities is the only way to prevent an Iranian bomb – but history and expert analysis suggest the opposite. No military strike can erase Iran’s nuclear knowledge or un-invent its technology. At best, bombing Iran might set its program back a few years. Indeed, even Israeli defense officials quietly acknowledge there is no guarantee that airstrikes would completely eliminate Iran’s capacity – key sites are buried deep underground or dispersed, and Iran could rebuild what is destroyed. Iran’s nuclear program is far more advanced and hardened today than were Iraq’s Osirak reactor (bombed by Israel in 1981) or Syria’s clandestine reactor (struck in 2007). A raid could slow Iran’s progress, but it would also almost certainly drive Iran to redouble its efforts afterward in a bid to truly deter any future attacks. As one analyst warned before the current war, attacking Iran’s nuclear sites could backfire by convincing Tehran’s leadership that only a nuclear deterrent will guarantee Iran’s survival. The hardliners in Tehran have long argued that negotiating with the West is pointless and that only strength is respected. Israel’s bombing campaign has likely validated that narrative in Iran. Any officials in Tehran who favored moderation or compromise have been decisively silenced now. In the wake of these strikes, Iran’s regime will feel vindicated in pursuing the very capability we most feared – and with all diplomatic avenues seemingly exhausted, they would have little left to lose by doing so.

Militarily, an open conflict with Iran poses enormous risks. Iran is not a lone actor that Israel can attack in isolation. It has allies and proxies across the region capable of drawing multiple countries into a bloody quagmire. We are already seeing flashes of this: Hezbollah and other militias are engaging Israel, raising the specter of a multi-front war. Iran’s ballistic missiles can reach across the Middle East; its arsenal of drones can threaten shipping lanes and neighboring Gulf states. If this conflict expands, it could engulf Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and the Gulf in violence. Civilian populations would be the ones to suffer most, as missile salvos and air strikes devastate cities. The global economy, too, stands in the crosshairs – a wider war could choke off oil exports from the Persian Gulf, sending energy prices skyrocketing and wrecking fragile economic recoveries. In short, a war over Iran’s nuclear program could make previous Middle East wars look mild by comparison. It would be truly disastrous for regional and international stability.

Legally and morally, the justification for a preventive strike on Iran is shaky at best. International law allows military force only in self-defense or with UN authorization – neither of which applies here. Iran, for all its hostile rhetoric, has not launched a direct attack on Israel, nor does it yet possess a nuclear weapon. To attack Iran now is to wage a preventive war, not a defensive one, a course the UN Charter and global norms strongly discourage. The last time a major preventive war was waged in the Middle East – the 2003 invasion of Iraq – it proved to be based on false premises and resulted in a strategic debacle. It is worth recalling the damning verdict of Britain’s own Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War: the UK joined that invasion “before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort,” Sir John Chilcot concluded. Those words ring eerily true today. Every peaceful option to constrain Iran’s nuclear program should be exhausted before considering force. In reality, diplomatic options – from restoring the JCPOA framework to pursuing new regional security arrangements – still exist, even if the path is hard. Launching missiles is easier than forging compromise, but it is also far more perilous.

Britain’s Choice: Diplomacy or Folly

The United Kingdom now faces a critical choice. As Israel’s closest Western ally after the United States, Britain will undoubtedly come under pressure to show solidarity in the conflict – whether through diplomatic support, military assets, or at least public endorsement of Israel’s “right to self-defense.” There will be voices urging London to fall in line behind Washington if the U.S. is dragged into hostilities. We’ve heard this tune before. But Britain is not bound by fate to follow allies into every misadventure. In this case especially, the UK has both moral and practical reasons to hold back. Simply put, Britain must not allow itself to be drawn into a war with Iran.

First, British involvement would accomplish little militarily while exposing the UK to significant risks. The Israeli strikes happened without British participation and do not require our forces – Israel has ample capability to conduct its campaign (for better or worse) on its own. If the United States, despite its public denials, eventually intervenes more directly, it does so by its own calculus of defending its assets and allies. There is no direct threat to UK territory or citizens that compels us to join this fight. Any UK military contribution – a token deployment of fighter jets, naval assets in the Gulf, or use of British bases – would be largely symbolic. Yet it would instantly make Britain a target for Iranian retaliation. Iran’s leaders have shown they will retaliate against those whom they perceive as complicit in attacks on their country. British forces in the Middle East (for example, the Royal Navy vessels patrolling Gulf waters, or troops in coalition bases) could come under fire. Even at home, we would elevate the risk of Iran or its proxies attempting terror attacks on UK soil as retribution. Entering a war carries costs and dangers that far outweigh any nebulous benefit of “standing with allies” in this particular instance.

Secondly, Britain should recognize that continuing down the path of escalation will foreclose any remaining diplomatic exit from this crisis. As a key player in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal, the UK knows the value of engagement with Iran. Britain has maintained diplomatic ties with Tehran even through the darkest times, and it joined Europe in trying to keep the JCPOA alive after the U.S. pulled out. Those efforts reflected not naivety, but hard realism: ultimately, dialogue is the only durable way to prevent proliferation. If we now turn our backs on diplomacy entirely, we accept that war is the only option – and we know where that leads. After exchanging bombs and blood with Iran, even the minimal trust needed for future negotiations would be gone. Iran would likely kick out what’s left of the IAEA inspectors and double down on a crash nuclear weapons program in secret. The nightmare scenario – a nuclear-armed Iran in a state of permanent hostility with the West – would become far more likely.

Britain can and must choose a different course. Instead of adding fuel to the flames, the UK should use its voice on the world stage to call for urgent de-escalation and a return to talks. This means working with European allies and even engaging adversaries like China or Russia (who also fear a Middle East war) to press all parties to stand down. It means supporting any neutral mediators – be it the Omanis, the UN Secretary-General, or others – who can broker a ceasefire and eventual diplomatic re-engagement. The UK should also make clear that it opposes actions that violate international law. A unilateral Israeli preventive strike sets a dangerous precedent, and Britain is within its rights to condemn moves that endanger global security, even when committed by friends. By refusing to endorse or participate in this attack, Britain aligns with the principle that international disputes should be resolved peacefully whenever possible.

Some will argue that by staying out, Britain undermines Israel or emboldens Iran. But the opposite is true: by injecting a measure of restraint, Britain would be keeping alive the only real hope of a long-term resolution. Iran’s nuclear program cannot be bombed away; it can only be constrained by a verifiable agreement or by an internal change in Iran’s own calculations. Every prior chance to achieve that – from early EU diplomacy, to the JCPOA, to the Vienna talks – was squandered. We should be asking why, and learning from those failures, not rushing to compound them with a new war. The UK, of all countries, should recall the cost of acting on flawed intelligence and fear – our experience in Iraq should have seared that lesson into our collective memory. The Chilcot Report on the Iraq War concluded that Britain went to war without exhausting peaceful options and that military action was not a last resort. We must not repeat that error.

Conclusion: Twenty years of crisis with Iran have taught us that there were many moments when a different choice could have been made. Time and again, diplomacy was attempted – and when it succeeded, as in 2015, we let it slip through our fingers. Now the worst-case scenario appears to be unfolding. But even now, it is not too late to change course. Escalating the war will only lock in a future of greater instability, nuclear proliferation, and human suffering. Britain must take a stand against plunging further into this abyss. We should refuse involvement in further military action against Iran and instead redouble efforts to find a diplomatic off-ramp. However bleak things look in this moment, the history of this crisis shows that peaceful solutions were possible – and they can be again. War, by contrast, promises only that the mistakes of the past will be paid for in blood, and that everyone will be worse off in the end. The UK’s clear stance now should be to say: enough. We will not be dragged into an unnecessary war with Iran. We will, instead, do everything in our power to stop it.

By Patrick Harrington

Sources:

• Atlantic Council – “Experts react: Israel just attacked Iran’s military and nuclear sites. What’s next?” (scenario analysis, June 12, 2025).
• Al Jazeera – “Israel strikes may make Iran more determined to pursue nuclear programme” (report by Mat Nashed, June 13, 2025).
• Background Document on Iran’s Nuclear Crisis (uploaded file, 2025) – historical details of Iran’s program, JCPOA, and international responses.
• Reuters – “Iranian state media confirms killing of Revolutionary Guards chief in Israeli strike” (news report, June 13, 2025).
• The Guardian – “Chilcot report: key points from the Iraq inquiry” (July 6, 2016).
• Additional references: House of Commons Library Briefing on Iran’s nuclear programme (Claire Mills, Oct 4, 2024); statements by Israeli officials and experts on conflict implications; International Atomic Energy Agency reports via media.